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Currently the peer-to-peer search focuses on efficient hash lookup systems which can be use in building 
more complex distributed systems. These system works well when their algorithms are executed in right 
direction but generally they don’t consider how to handle misbehaving nodes. In our paper we considers 
different sorts of security problems which are inherent in peer-to peer systems based on distributed hash 
lookup systems. We examine different types of problems that this kind of systems might face, taking 
examples from existing systems. Here we propose some design principles for detecting as well preventing 
those problems. 
Keywords- Distributed hash lookup systems, verifiable system invariants, verifiable key assignment, 
Server selection in routing. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Recently a great number of systems were built on top of distributed peer-to-peer hash lookup systems 
[6,9,10]. Keys lookups are performed by queries routing through a series of nodes; each of these nodes 
maintains a local touting table to forward query towards the node which is ultimately responsible for the 
key. These nodes can be used to store data, i.e. as a distributed hash table or may be file system [1,7]. Some 
researcher took advantage of other aspects of the lookup system, like the properties of lookup routing [8]. 
This is unfortunate that the architecture of many of these systems assume that the nodes involved in a 
system are trusted. In an intranet, such as inside a corporate firewall, the assumption of trust might be 
justified, but on an open network, like the Internet, still it may be possible to exclude un-trusted nodes with 
the help of a central certificate granting authority; whose solution was proposed by Pastry [6]. But there 
may be many situations in which it is not desirable to constrain membership of a peer-to-peer system. In 
situations like this, the system should be able to operate even though some participants are likely a 
malicious.  
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A kind of attacks on distributed hash tables causes the system to return incorrect data to the application. 
Fortunately, the authenticity and correctness of such data can be addressed by using techniques like 
cryptographic, for example self-certifying path names [3]. The techniques detect and ignore un-authentic 
data in the systems. This paper focuses on the those attacks that threaten the aliveness of the system by 
preventing participants from finding data. The main part of the paper is a series of examples of particular 
weaknesses in existing distributed hash algorithms. Our paper discusses potential defenses for few of these 
problems, and derives a set of general design principles from them and summarized in Table 1. All these 
principles are driven by the fact that any information obtained over the network can not be trusted and 
hence must be verified.  
 
Sl. Design Principles 
1 Allow the querier node to observe lookup progress  
2 Define verifiable system invariants  by a node 
3 Assign keys to nodes in a verifiable way 
4 Server selection in routing may be abused 
5 Cross-check routing tables using random queries 
6 Avoid responsibility to a single point (node). 
Table 1: Design Principles 
2.  Background 
 
In general distributed hash tables consist of a storage API layered on top of a lookup protocol. Each lookup 
protocols consist of a few basic components: 
1. a key identifier space 
2. a node identifier space 
3. rules for associating keys to a particular node 
4. routing tables for each node that refer to other nodes 
5. set of rules for updating routing tables as nodes joins and leave 
 
 Any lookup protocol maps a desired key identifier to the IP address of a node responsible for that key. A 
storage protocol is layered on top of the lookup protocol, then storing, caching, replicating, and 
authenticating of data are taking care of. CAN[5], Chord[9] and Pastry [6] all these protocol fits into this 
general framework.  
 
In the lookup, routing is handled by defining by a distance function on the identifier space, such that 
distance can be measured between the current node and the desired key; the node responsible is defined to 
be the node closest to the key. Typically a lookup protocol has an invariant that must be maintained in order 
to guarantee that data can be found. As an example, in the Chord system, nodes are arranged in a 
one-dimensional identifier space; here the required invariant is that every node knows the other node that 
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immediately follows it in the identifier space. In case an attacker breaks this invariant, Chord system will 
not be able to look up keys correctly. 
 
Similarly, in order to be sure that each piece of data is available, the storage layer will also maintain some 
invariants. In DHash [1], a storage API layered on Chord used by CFS, there have been two important 
invariants, first, it must ensure that the node which Chord believes is responsible for a key actually stores 
the data associated with that key. It is important that DHash maintain replicas of each piece of data because 
nodes can fail, and that those replicas be at predictable nodes. An attacker may potentially target either of 
these invariants. 
 
3.  Define Adversary Model 
 
In this paper, the adversaries that we considered are participants in a distributed hash lookup system that do 
not follow the protocol correctly. Instead, by providing them with false information, they seek to mislead 
legitimate nodes.  
 
We assumed that a malicious mode is able to generate a packet with arbitrary contents, including forged 
source IP, but that node is only able to examine packet’s addressed to itself. i.e. malicious nodes are not 
able to modify communication or overhear between other nodes. A malicious node can only receive packets 
addressed to its own IP address means that an IP address can be used as a weak form of node identity. If 
any node receives a packet from an IP address, it can verify that the packet’s sender owns the address by 
sending request for confirming that IP address. We consider malicious nodes conspire together, but each 
one is limited as above. This allows to gather additional data by an adversary and act more deviously by 
providing false but confirmable information.    
 
Rest of the paper will examine different ways in which a malicious node can use these abilities to subvert 
the system. 
 
4.  Different Attacks and Defenses  
 
This part of the paper organized into attacks against the routing, attacks against the data storage system and 
finally some general considerations. 
 
We know that the first line of defense for any attack is detection of the attack. Many attacks can be detected 
by the node being attacked, because the nodes which are involved violating invariants or procedure 
contracts. However, once an attack has been detected, it is less clear what to do. A node may really be 
malicious or may be it have failed to detect that it was being tricked. So, our discussion focuses on the 
methods to detect and possibly correct in consistent information. Here we will see that achieving 
verifiability underlies all of our detection techniques.   
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4.1.  Attacks on Routing 
 
In a lookup protocol only the routing portion involves maintaining routing tables; it then dispatches 
requests to the nodes in the routing table. It is quite difficult to identify that the routing is correct in a 
distributed hash table. n existing system. There are considerable chances for an adversary to play in existing 
systems. This kind of attacks can be detected if the system defines considers verifiable system invariants 
and verify them. When an invariant fails, the system must have some recovery mechanism.     
 
Incorrect Lookup Routing  A single malicious node may forward lookups to an incorrect or non-existent 
node. Because the malicious node will be participating in the system’s routing update in a usual way, it will 
appear to be alive and will not ordinarily be removed from the routing tables of other existing nodes. In this 
way re-transmissions of the misdirected lookups will also be sent to the malicious nodes.   
 
Luckily blatantly incorrect forwarding can easily be detected. The querier knows that the lookup is 
supposed to get ‘closer’ to the key identifier at each hop. The querier should check, so that this attack can 
be detected. If this kind of attack is detected, the querier might recover by backtracking to the last good hop 
and may ask for an alternative steps which offers less progress.  
 
For a querier node to be able to perform this kind of check, each steps of progresses must be visible to the 
querier. As an example, CAN proposes an optimization where each node keep tracks of the network RTTs 
to neighbor nodes and forward to the neighbors with the best ratio of progress to RTT. This proofs that 
queries are normally forwarded without consulting with the querier node. Thus in CAN, a querier node 
simply can’t verify forward progress. So the querier node should be allowed to observe the lookup 
progress.  
 
The malicious nodes may also may declare (incorrectly) that a random node is the node which is 
responsible for a key. Because the querying node may be far away in the identifier space, It may not know 
that this node is not the closest node in fact, which could cause a key to be stored in an incorrect node or 
may prevent the key from being found. This type of problem can be fixed in following two ways: 
Firstly, the querier node must ensure that the destination node itself agrees that it is in fact a correct 
termination point for the particular query. In Cord system, the predecessor returns the address of the 
query’s endpoint (i.e. ‘successor’) instead of the endpoint itself, which allows the attack possible. A 
malicious node may cause the query to undershoot the right successor, which may cause DHash to violate 
its storage location invariant. If the node that referred to is a good node, then it should not be responsible 
for this key and can generate an error. 
 
Secondly, assignment of keys to a node should be in a verifiable way by the system.  Particularly in some 
systems, keys are assigned to the node which is closest to them in the identifier space. Thus, to assign keys 
to nodes verifiably. it is sufficient to derive node identifiers in a verifiable way. In contrast this to CAN, 
that allows any dode to specify ots own identity. Which makes it not possible by another node to verify that 
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a node is validly claiming responsibility for a key. In some system, like Chord, gave an effort to defend 
against this by basing a node’s identifier on a cryptographic hash of IP address and port. Since this needs to 
contact the node, it is easy to say if one is speaking to the correct node.     
 
A long-term identities based on public keys may be derived by a system, which has performance penalties 
because of the cost of signatures, but would allow systems to have faith on the origin of messages and will 
validate of their contents. This means, public keys will facilitate the verifiability of the system. Particularly, 
a certificate with a node’s public key and address can be used by new nodes to safely join the system.  
 
Incorrect Routing Updates  In a lookup system each node builds its own routing table by consulting 
other nodes, a malicious node may corrupt the routing tables of other nodes by sending them incorrect 
updates. Effect of these updates would cause good nodes to misdirect queries to inappropriate nodes ot to 
non-existent nodes. If the system knows correct routing updates follows certain requirements, this can be 
verified. For example, in Pastry systems, updates require that every table entry has a correct prefix. 
Blatantly incorrect updates can easily be identified and dropped. Only after verifying itself that the remote 
node is reachable, the updates should be incorporated in a node’s routing table.  
 
By taking advantage of systems that allow nodes to choose between multiple correct routing entries, a more 
delicate attack would be eminent. For example, to minimize latency, CAN’s RTT optimization allows 
precisely in order to minimize latency.  A malicious node may take advantages of this flexibility and my 
provide nodes that are undesirable. For example, it may choose an unreliable node, node with high latency 
or even a fellow malicious node. This may not affect strict correctness of the protocol but it may affect 
applications that may wish to use underlying lookup system to find nodes satisfying certain criteria. For 
example, in Tarzan anonymizing network [2] it proposes the use of Chord as a way of discovering random 
nodes to be used in dynamic anonymizing tunnels. Any flexibility in Chord may allow adversary to bias the 
nodes chosen and may have to compromise the design goals of Tarzan.  The applications of this should be 
aware that server selection in routing may be abused. 
 
Partition  For a bootstrap to happen, a new node wish to participate in any lookup system must contact 
some existing node. At the time of bootstrap, it is vulnerable of being partitioned into an incorrect network. 
For example, suppose a set of malicious nodes formed a parallel network, which are running the same 
protocols as the real and legitimate network. This type of parallel network is entirely internally consistent 
and may contain some data from the real network. Accidentally any new node may join this network and 
thus will fail to achieve correct results. Any malicious node might also cross-register in the legitimate 
network and may cause new participants to be connected to the parallel network even if they have a valid 
bootstrap node. 
 
Malicious nodes may deny service by using partitions or may learn about the behavior of clients that it 
would otherwise be unable to observe. For example, let say a service was made available to publish 
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documents anonymously, at that time an adversary could establish a malicious system that shadows the real 
one but allows it to track clients who are storing and reading files.    
 
Preventing a new node from being diverted into an incorrect network, the node must bootstrap via some 
sort of trusted source. Such trusted sources are likely be out-of-band to the system itself. At the time of 
rejoining to the system, a node can either use these trusted nodes or it may use one of the other nodes it has 
previously discovered in the network. However developing trust metrics for particular nodes can be risky in 
a network with highly transient nodes that lack any strong sense of identity. Via DHCP if a particular 
address is assigned, for example, sometime a node could be malicious but benign the next. Also in this case 
use, use of public keys may reduce the risk. 
 
In case a node believes that it has successfully joined a network in the past, then the node can detect new 
malicious partitions by cross-checking with the history stored with it. A node can maintain a set of other 
node’s information that it has used successfully in the past. So that it can cross-check routing tables by 
using random queries. Also by asking those nodes to do the same random queries and lastly comparing 
those results with its own. This way a node can verify whether its view of the network is consistent with the 
other nodes. Randomness is important because a malicious partition can not distinguish verification probes 
from a legitimate query that it would like to divert. On the contrary a node which has been trapped in a 
malicious partition may accidentally discover the correct network in this way, where the right network may 
be defined as the one which serve desired data. 
 
 
4.2  Attacks on Storage and Retrieval 
 
Any malicious node is able join and participate in the lookup protocol correctly, but will be denied the 
existence of data it was responsible for. It might also claim to actually store data when asked, but then 
refuse to serve it to clients. To handle this type of attack, the storage layer must imply replication. The 
replication should be handled in such a way that no single node is responsible for replication or facilitating 
access to the replicas; that node will be a single point of failure. So, the client must be able to determine 
independently the correct node to contact for replicas. This will allow them to verify that truly data is 
unavailable with all replica sites. Similarly, all nodes those are holding replicas must ensure that the 
replication invariant (i.e. at least n copies exist at all times) is maintained. If not so, a single node would be 
able to prevent all replication process to happen. This is to avoid single points of responsibility.  
 
Nodes doing lookups should be prepared for the threat of possible malicious nodes as well. For this, it must 
consult at least two replica sites to be sure that either all of the replicas are bad or that the data is truly 
missing.  
 
For example, a DHash does not follow this principle; here only the node immediately associated with the 
key will be responsible for the replication. Even, if the storing node performed replication, DHash will still 
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be vulnerable to the actual successor lying about the r later successors. As proposed in CAN, replication 
with multiple hash functions is one way to avoid this reliance on a single machine. 
 
The attack can further be refined in a system which does not assign nodes verifiable identifiers. In this type 
of system, node can choose to become responsible for the data that it wishes to hide. Here DHash still are at 
risk, despite Chord having verifiable node identifiers, which is because the identifier was derived from a 
hash of node’s IP address, port number and virtual node number. Because of a person in control of a node 
can run a large number of virtual nodes, still they effects some degree of choice in which data they wish to 
hide. IPv6 or sparsely used IPv4 networks may also allow to have access to many addresses by a single 
host.  
 
4.3.  Other Miscellaneous Attacks 
 
Inconsistent Behavior  If a malicious node presents a good face to part of the network, it would be more 
difficult to detect when it attacks. A malicious node may choose to maximize its impact by ensuring its 
behavior correctly for certain nodes. In the identifier space, one possible class would be nodes near it. 
Despite the fact that nodes that are distant see poor or invalid behavior, these nodes will not see any reason 
to remove the node from their routing tables. If queries must routed through close nodes before reaching the 
target node, this may not be a serious problem. However, most of the routing systems have their ways of 
jumping to distant points in the identifier space for speeding up queries.  
 
Ideally, a distant node would be able to convince local nodes that ‘locally good’ malicious node is in fact a 
malicious. However, without public keys and digital signatures, it is not possible for a node to distinguish a 
report of a ‘locally good’ node being malicious. From a malicious report trying to tarnish a node which is 
actually a benign. On the other hand, this can be proven with public keys by requiring nodes to sign all of 
their responses, then a report would contain the incorrect response and the inappropriateness could be 
verified. Lacking this, every node must determine of its own as to whether another node is malicious. 
 
Overload of Targeted Nodes  It can attempt to overload targeted nodes with garbage packets because and 
adversary can generate packets. It is a standard denial of service attack and not a subversion of the system. 
This would cause the node to appear to fail and hence the system will be adapted to this as if the node failed 
in some normal manner. A system must use some degree of data replication so that it can handle even the 
normal node failure case. The attack will be effective if the replication is weak or if the malicious node is 
one of the replicas or may be colluding with some of the replicas.  
 
Denial of service attacks impact can be partially mitigated by ensuring that the node’s identifier assignment 
algorithm assigns identifiers to nodes randomly with respect to network topology. Additionally, the replicas 
should be located in such locations where they will be physically disparate. These would prevent a 
localized attack by preventing access to an entire portion of key space. If an adversary wishes to shut out an 
entire portion of the key space, it should have to flood packets all over the Internet.  
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Rapid Joins and Leaves  Nodes join and leave the system, the rules imply that ne nodes must obtain data 
from replicas which was store by nodes that left the system. In order for the lookup procedures to work 
correctly, this rebalancing is required. A malicious node may trick the system into rebalancing which 
unnecessarily causes excess data transfer and control traffic. Which in turn reduce the efficiency and 
performance of the system. This kind of attack will work best if the attacker can avoid being involved in 
data movement since this will consume the bulk of the bandwidth. An adversary may try to convince the 
system that a particular node was unavailable or a new node joined (falsely). However our model allows the 
adversary no way of accomplishing the former; the latter case it will involve acknowledged data transfers 
which the adversary can not correctly acknowledge.  Other rebalancing involve the adversary node itself, 
requiring it to be involved in the data movement. 
 
Any distributed hash table must provide a mechanism to deal with this problem, regardless of whether there 
are malicious nodes present. Previously it was shown that in some file sharing systems, peers join and leave 
the system very rapidly [4]. The amount of data stored and the rate of replication at each node must be kept 
at levels that allow for timely replication without causing network overload, even when regular nodes join 
and leave the network. 
 
Unsolicited messages  Sometime a malicious node is able to create a situation where it can send an 
unsolicited response to a query. For example, consider a lookup process where querier Q referred by node 
N to node A. Node  N knows that Q’s next contact A, presumably with a follow-up to the query just 
processed by N. Thus N can attempt to forge a message from A to Q with incorrect results.   
 
Employing standard authentication techniques such as digital signatures or message authentication code 
would be the best defense against this. Since, digital signatures are expensively currently and MAC’s 
require shared keys. A more reasonable defense might include a random nonce with each query to ensure 
that the response is accurate.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper categorized and presents with examples the basic attacks which a peer-to-peer hash lookup 
systems must be aware of. Here it discusses all the details of such attacks as applied to some specific 
systems, and also suggests defenses in many cases. It then accumulates these defenses into a set of general 
design principles: (a) Allow the querier node to observe lookup progress, (b) Define verifiable system 
invariants  by a node, (c) Assign keys to nodes in a verifiable way, (d) Server selection in routing may be 
abused, (e) Cross-check routing tables using random queries, (f) Avoid responsibility to a single point 
(nodes). 
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